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THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT
Reflections on the Recent Past and Implications for the Future
Matthew Curtis *
The Supreme Court issued 75 decisions this past term and carried two cases over for
decision during the Fall term: Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board and Price v. Bossier Parish School
Board. First Amendment rights were reinforced by two Supreme Court decisions, but were
limited by a third. The Court issued several rulings on civil rights, and in one of the cases,
SaenZ v. Roe, the Court resurrected the long dead "privileges or immunities" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Businesses saw the Court modify trial procedure regarding expert
testimony and class action suits, and the Court also upheld the FCC's authority to regulate
the local telephone industry. And, in several criminal cases, the Court both expanded and
limited police power. But most significantly, the Court took what appeared to be three rather
lackluster cases, dusted off the theories of state and dual sovereignty, and finished the term
with some real fireworks in the area of federalism.
During the upcoming term, the Court will have the opportunity to expand its federalism
jurisprudence in four upcoming cases (previewed in Section III): Reno v. Condon; Kiel v.
Florida Board of Regents and its companion case, United States v. Florida Board of Regents; and
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States.
The Court will also hear several significant First Amendment cases: aid to private
parochial schools (Mitchell v. Helms); compulsory funding of political speech (Board of Regents
v. Southworth); campaign finance reform (Nixon v. SHRINK); regulation of pornography on
cable televsision (United States v. Playboy); nude dancing (Erie, Pa. v. Pap's A.M.); and the
media's access to criminal files (LAPD v. United Reporting). It will also hear a Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment challenge to a Hawaii law that restricts the right to vote in a special
election to only "native Hawaiians" (Rice v. Cayetano). A federal regulatory case will certainly
draw substantial attention: can the FDA regulate tobacco/nicotine as a drug? (Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco). And the Court will determine whether the
standard set by Terry v. Ohio in 1968 permits police to stop and search someone who merely
runs from an identifiable police officer.
Few trends can be identified from the past term. One trend appears to simply be that
federalism cases have received a consistent majority of the same five justices - Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas - without any defections. And, recognizing such
labels are of limited value, the five "conservatives" generally seem to uphold conservative
values, while the four "liberals" generally favor liberal values, but there were significant
crossovers among the justices on several cases - notably Justice O'Connor's opinion in Davis
v. Monroe County permitting school liability for student-on-student sexual harassment, Justice
Scalia in SaenZ v. Roe rejecting California's graduated welfare scheme, and Justice Breyer's
joining of the majority in permitting the search of passenger's belongings even when the
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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passenger is not suspected of a crime - Wyoming v. Houghton. What does that mean for the
upcoming term?
The upcoming federalism cases raise some Fourteenth Amendment concerns not
addressed in this past term's cases. Thus, it is not clear that the previous alliance between
the five conservatives will last. Even should the alliance hold, what the impact will be is still
uncertain.
Because of what appear to be conflicting values internal to the positions of both the
liberals and conservatives on the Court, the outcome of the remaining cases seems equally
uncertain. The only thing that is certain, is that the docket of cases for the upcoming term
ensures an exciting term and some potentially impassioned opinions and dissents.
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LEAN, MEAN HIGH COURT MACHINE
Court's Finishing Date is Earliest in 30 Years
Texas Lawyer
Monday, July 19, 1999
Tony Mauro
The U.S. Supreme Court's final day on
the bench was dramatic, no question
about it: three decisions on federalism,
three dissents read from the bench, each
one more bitter than the last.
Almost as dramatic as the court's final
session itself was the day it occurred:
Wednesday, June 23, the earliest finishing
date in 30 years. No more dawdling right
up to, or even past, the July 4th weekend
as the court has done in recent years.
Rehnquist must have been doubly
pleased that day. The federalism opinions,
giving states new leverage in their tectonic
battles with the federal government,
represented a triumph for a position he
has espoused for decades. Yet the early
end of the term represented, in a small
way, another sort of personal triumph: 13
years after becoming chief justice,
Rehnquist has finally wrested the docket
of the court away from the ghost of
Warren Burger, who exalted
administration but never managed to get
the docket under control. It is no
accident, perhaps, that the last time the
court ended this early was Earl Warren's
last year as chief justice, before Burger
took the helm in 1969.
Summer Vacation
The end of the term came early
enough this year that the law clerks, with
their decision writing finished, could put
on their annual top-secret skits for the
justices that Tuesday. And early enough
that Rehnquist could more leisurely make
his way down to Hot Springs, Va., in time
to lead the Thursday night sing-along at
the annual 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals' conference. Rehnquist stayed
through Saturday, giving his annual review
of Supreme Court "dogs" the obscure
decisions that Rehnquist poetically
described as cases that "were born to
blush unseen and waste their sweetness on
desert air were I not to talk about them."
(Who else but the chief justice could get
away with a speech on the most
insignificant cases of the term?)
The term ended early enough also for
the justices to wrap things up in their
chambers before dashing off to their far-
flung summer teaching gigs. Salzburg,
Austria, draws Anthony Kennedy and
Stephen Breyer, while Rehnquist heads to
Montreal; Antonin Scalia to Nice, France;
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the isle of
Crete, in Greece. Summer school beckons
this crowd, not the more personal retreats
like Goose Prairie, Wash., or Nantucket,
Mass., which lured the likes of William
Douglas and William Brennan Jr.,
respectively. As David Garrow recounts in
his book "Liberty & Sexuality," Douglas
used to extol Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes for getting the court to wrap up
its work by Memorial Day each year.
"Now, there was a chief justice!" Douglas
would say.
Rehnquist may not be a Charles Evans
Hughes, but he's doing something to get
the court out of town so early. Theories
abound. The most obvious answer is the
27
low number of signed opinions, 75, that
the court turned out. But that's not all of
it; the court had the same number of cases
in the 1995 term and ended July 1.
Myriad other factors may have
contributed. By the Associated Press'
reckoning, David Souter, reputed to be
the court's slowpoke writer, was the least
prolific justice this term 14 separate
majorities, dissents and concurrences
while John Paul Stevens, a lean, efficient
machine at age 79, cranked out 29
separate pieces of writing. This term, there
were also several groupings of cases, three
on federalism and three on the workplace
provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, possibly cutting down on
research time. Maybe that's the way to get
the court's attention these days: hit the
justices with three related conundrums at
the same time, and the economies of scale
will appeal to them.
Another small factor may have been
the court's decision to schedule two cases
for reargument next term Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board and Price v.
Bossier Parish School Board something
the court has not done since 1991. The
court sometimes punts in this way if the
decision "won't write" or if the court is so
tangled up over it that it can't get
untangled in the final blur before
adjournment.
Other than those two cases, this
term's cases may have generally been
cleaner, more straightforward and less
argument-provoking than in the past
(except for the federalism trio and a few
others). That may have helped move
things along as well. The court's no-
nonsense approach to telling the other
branches of government when to back off
may have reduced some of the court's
usual hand-wringing in some cases. But
most of all, the early finish is probably a
tribute to Rehnquist, who has gradually
gotten the court to become more efficient
as its docket shrinks.
Other justices speak about the memos
from the chief that make it obvious who
has fallen behind in writing. Subtle threats
of withholding future opinion assignments
until the justices get caught up provide a
considerable incentive to write more
quickly. That's also easier, of course, if the
cases are less contentious. Warren, the
legendary "super chief," had a similar
touch.
In 1963, the Warren court issued 110
opinions and still completed its work by
June 15. But Burger, for all his efforts to
professionalize the judiciary, was not a
master of efficiency in running the
Supreme Court. The late court scholar
Bernard Schwartz described Burger as a
"failure" as chief justice, in no small part
because of "the manner in which he
presided at conferences and assigned
opinions."
The current justices could use the
extra week of recess to gather strength for
the fall term. The federalism wars will
continue, and issues that the court has not
dealt with in a while - aid to parochial
schools and campaign finance reform, for
example - await their return on the First
Monday in October.
Copyright © 1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group, Inc.
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HIGH COURT'S CONSERVATIVES CHANGE
BALANCE OF POWER
Five justices Steadily Shift Federal Government Might to the States
It's Unclear How Far Pendulum Will Swing
Los Angeles Times
Saturday, June 26, 1999
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
Few Americans wake up in the
morning worried about threats to their
state's "sovereignty" or the fate of
"federalism," the balance of power
between national and state authorities.
Yet five justices of the Supreme Court
have made these issues their cause, and
this week's final round of rulings for the
term showed them determined to return
American law to an earlier era.
Beginning four years ago, the court's
conservatives have steadily stripped away
power from Congress and federal judges
and given the states a new shield of
immunity. It is unclear, though, where
they are headed. Back to the 1950s, before
the expansion of federal civil rights
protection? Or to the 1920s, before the
New Deal era and federal intervention in
the economy?
The court's four liberal dissenters fear
their colleagues are looking to the 1780s,
when a weak national government held
little sway over the states.
"This is the first time in more than 60
years where we see an aggressive,
conservative activism" from the Supreme
Court, said Louis M. Seidman, a liberal
law professor at Georgetown University.
"They have shown themselves willing to
overturn decisions made by the
democratic process, and they are prepared
to do it without any basis in the text of the
Constitution."
Despite their fervor for federalism,
however, the court's conservatives do not
always stick together, and this term also
saw liberal triumphs in the areas of sexual
harassment and welfare benefits.
For example, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, a champion of states' rights, is
also a historic figure in women's rights
and supplied the decisive fifth vote to rule
that schools can be held liable if they
ignore the repeated sexual harassment of
one student by another.
And sometimes precedent still
prevails, conservative activism
notwithstanding: In the 1960s, the court
ruled that states may not discriminate
between new and old residents. This year,
a 7-2 majority stuck to that principle and
struck down California's plan to pay lower
welfare benefits to newcomers.
But those are the exceptions in a court
where states' rights conservatism remains
the driving force.
On Wednesday, the 5-4 majority ruled
that the principle of "state sovereign
immunity" shielded states from having to
pay overtime wages to their workers, as
required by federal law. Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy admitted the Constitution
said nothing about the states having a
special exemption from valid federal laws.
Nonetheless, he concluded that the
"founders' silence" shows the notion of
state immunity was understood and
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accepted in 1787, when the Constitution
was written.
The resurgence of states' rights has
been called the third wave of Supreme
Court activism during this century.
Pro-business conservatives controlled
the court during the first decades of the
20th century. They regularly struck down
state and federal laws that, for example,
sought to halt child labor or ensure
minimum wages and maximum hours for
workers. They said the Constitution did
not allow the government to regulate
business, although they could point to no
provision that said so.
This is known as the "Lochner era"
among lawyers, which refers to a 1905
ruling that threw out a New York law that
set a maximum 10-hour day for workers.
This era came to an end in 1936, after
the conservative court and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt came into open
conflict. On a series of 5-4 votes, the
court struck down several New Deal laws,
and FDR wanted revenge.
A year later, the court reversed itself,
as Roosevelt replaced the "nine old men"
with liberal appointees.
The next wave of activism was liberal.
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the
court wielded its power to strike down
racial segregation laws, to throw out
official prayers in schools and to expand
the rights of criminal defendants. This era
peaked with the 1973 Roe vs. Wade
ruling, which struck down laws banning
abortion.
In that case, the liberals were unable
to point to a constitutional provision that
created a right to abortion. A few years
before, when striking down an archaic
state law that barred the sale of
contraceptives, Justice William 0.
Douglas said a right to privacy was
contained in the Bill of Rights. Those
words were not mentioned, he said, but
privacy could be found "emanating" from
the "penumbras" around the individual
rights.
Even since, those words are an inside
joke among conservatives who mock
liberals for inventing new rights.
According to friends, Justice Clarence
Thomas keeps a sign in his office that
says, "Don't water the penumbras."
The latest wave of conservative
activism began in 1995, and its
unquestioned leader is Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist.
As a young Arizona lawyer, he got a
start in politics as a legal advisor to Sen.
Barry Goldwater, who captured the
Republican presidential nomination in
1964. Goldwater, too, preached states'
rights and opposed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which outlawed racial segregation in
hotels, restaurants and other public
businesses and made it illegal for
employers to discriminate based on race.
Goldwater maintained Congress had no
power under the Constitution to pass such
a law.
Though Goldwater was soundly
defeated in the general election by Lyndon
B. Johnson, Rehnquist later came to
Washington to work for President Nixon
and was sent to the court in 1971.
President Reagan named him chief justice
in 1986.
Four years ago, Rehnquist put
together a 5-4 majority to strike down a
new federal law that outlawed guns near
schools. The ruling marked the first time
since 1936 that the court had thrown out
a federal law on the ground that Congress
did not have the power to enact it.
A year later, the same 5-4 majority
struck down part of the Brady Act on
handgun sales, then overturned a new
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federal law to protect religious liberty. A
third decision declared states had a
"sovereign immunity" and generally could
not be sued in federal court.
This week's rulings pressed forward
the trend in three important ways. Before,
state courts were still open to those who
said their federal rights had been violated
by a state agency. The 5-4 ruling in Alden
vs. Maine closed that door. The decision
appears to leave 4.7 million state
employees with no practical way to
enforce their rights under federal law.
Second, the justices made clear they
would not protect private businesses
when state agencies stole their property.
The Constitution gives Congress the
power to protect patents and copyrights,
and laws were passed to enforce those
property rights. But in College Savings
Bank vs. Florida Prepaid, Rehnquist said
those laws cannot be enforced against
states.
And, third, the court made clear
Congress had no power to remedy the
matter.
The next test will come in the fall
when the court considers whether federal
antidiscrimination laws protect state
workers. Several professors and librarians
at Florida State University say they were
victims of age discrimination. At issue,
however, is whether the law covers a state
university (U.S. vs. Kimel).
Harvard law professor Laurence H.
Tribe says he fears basic civil rights
protections could be in jeopardy if the
trend continues.
"Activism doesn't even describe these
holdings. They are extraordinary," he said.
State experts and conservative
scholars, however, say the court is simply
upholding the Constitution's separation of
powers.
"This is not a revolution," said
Richard Ruda, counsel for the State and
Local Legal Center in Washington. "This
reaffirms the system of dual sovereignty
of the states and the federal government."
For this term, the last words from the
court on this subject were spoken from
the bench by dissenters, who took turns
jabbing back at the conservatives.
Justice John Paul Stevens accused the
Rehnquist majority of finding the notion
of state sovereign immunity in the
"penumbras" of the Constitution.
Justices David H. Souter and Stephen
G. Breyer spoke of the Lochner era and
its now-repudiated decisions.
"The resemblance of today's state
sovereign immunity decision to the
Lochner era . .. is striking," Souter said.
Then, an out-of-touch court created a
"fictional" world in which individual
factory workers were free to negotiate
over their wages, he said.
Now, today's court has created an
idealized but fictional world of state
governments that are more attuned to the
people, he said.
"I expect the court's late essay into
immunity doctrine will prove the equal of
its earlier experiment in laissez-faire,"
Souter said, "the one being as unrealistic
as the other, as indefensible and probably
as fleeting."
On that note, the justices adjourned
for the summer.
Copyright C 1999 Times Mirror Company
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REHNQUIST COURT TAKING STAND FOR STATES
5-4 Ruhngs Increasingly Cut Into Congress' Power
Austin American-Statesman
Sunday, July 4, 1999
Aaron Epstein
WASHINGTON - Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's Supreme Court, now
13 years old, is assured of a prominent
place in American legal history. It has
emerged as a potent check on the power
of the national government.
Just before slippmg away early for a
summer rest, Rehnquist and his four
conservative allies on the Supreme Court
showed what they care most passionately
about, what they want to be most
remembered for -- not so much for how
they have changed the law on such hot-
button issues as race or religion, but for
their powerful, if still incomplete, impact
on the fundamental design of government
itself. They are forcing a dramatic shift in
the balance of state and federal power --
away from Washington and toward the
capitals of the 50 states.
Walter Dellinger, a liberal
constitutional law professor at Duke
University and former acting solicitor
general for the Clinton administration,
said the Rehnquist court is now supremely
confident in its willingness to use its gavel
against Congress.
"By my count, the court has
invalidated 11 acts of Congress in the last
three years. We've seen nothing like this
since the 1930s," Dellinger said.
The court's doctrinal realignment of
the federal-state structure is of little
interest to most Americans. It recalls
memories of dreary high school civics
classes, and fascinates mostly legal
scholars, who regularly churn out a welter
of arcane, impenetrable tomes on the
subject, which they call federalism. But
the Supreme Court's constitutional
reconstruction has practical consequences
for real people that will have an even
greater impact in the future, unless a
presidential appointment robs the
conservatives of its pivotal fifth vote.
In three ideologically identical 5-4
votes announced late last month at the
end of a generally dull term, the court
allowed the states to ignore provisions in
labor, patent and unfair-competition laws
enacted by Congress.
The conservative majority held that
without the consent of the states, the
nation's 4.7 million state employees
cannot sue when they are underpaid in
violation of federal minimum-wage or
overtime requirements. And without the
consent of the states, businesses and
patent holders cannot sue state
universities or agencies that enter the
marketplace and infringe on private
patents or compete unfairly in violation of
federal laws.
Why? The states have "sovereign
immunity" from private lawsuits.
Those words cannot be found in the
text of the Constitution. But, the court's
conservatives said, the concept is
embedded in the design of the nation's
governmental structure, making it an
essential, inviolable element of the
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division of power between Washington
and the state capitals.
A clear split
And it is on this closely divided issue,
and no other, that the Supreme Court's
five conservative justices invariably stick
together, leaving the four moderate-
liberals feeling helpless and unreconciled,
and hoping that this slenderest of
majorities will dissolve with the next
presidential appointment, or the one after
that.
On other close questions, the shifting
votes of the two centrist justices, Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor,
usually prove decisive. But in the states'
rights cases, there have been no swing
voters. The majority consists of
Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
All but Thomas were appointed by
President Reagan, a champion of curbing
national power. President Bush, Reagan's
fellow Republican, nominated Thomas.
The consistent dissenters in the states'
rights cases are John Paul Stevens and
David Souter and Clinton appointees
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer.
The flavor of this intense debate is
apparent in capsule views of two of the
opposing justices. One focuses on the
state's problem, the other on the
individual's dilemma.
Kennedy: To give Congress the power
to authorize a private citizen to sue an
unwilling state for money damages "could
create staggering burdens, giving Congress
a power and a leverage over the states that
is not contemplated by our constitutional
design. Congress must accord states the
esteem due to them as joint participants in
a federal system."
Souter: The creditor in question is not
a mere bill collector out to dun the state,
"but a citizen whose federal rights have
been violated, and a constitutional
structure that stints on enforcing federal
rights out of an abundance of delicacy
toward the states has substituted politesse
in place of respect for the rule of law."
How long will the thin conservative
majority endure?
At least for the remainder of this
administration. Republicans controlling
the Senate would be unlikely to confirm
another nominee of President Clinton,
especially with only 18 months left in his
term.
How long will the thin conservative
majority endure? It could disappear if
another Democratic president fills a
vacancy caused by the departure of a
conservative justice -- most likely
Rehnquist, who turns 75 on Oct. 1, or
O'Connor, 69. On the other hand, the
election of a Republican president and the
departure of the oldest justice from the
liberal side of the court -- Stevens, 79 --
could strengthen the conservative margin.
Meanwhile, more states' rights cases
have arrived in the court's mail, each
carrying repercussions for millions of
Americans.
The justices have already agreed to
decide whether state employees in Florida
can sue the state for violating the federal
law against age discrimination, and
whether a federal privacy law can stop
states from collecting millions of dollars in
revenues on the sales of personal
information submitted on driver's license
applications.
Yet another case could stop victims of
sexual assault from suing states under the
Violence Against Women Act, and
underpaid women from suing states under
the Equal Pay Act.
The rest of the record
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The Rehnquist court's legacy must
also include its repeated condemnation of
government policies that treated people
based on their race. In its apparent effort
to move the nation toward a colorblind
legal landscape, this court has struck down
black voting districts, restricted federal
affirmative action programs, limited
school desegregation programs and
permitted minority preferences to be
barred in university admissions. It has also
drilled new holes in Thomas Jefferson's
metaphorical wall preventing government
and religion from intruding on each other.
Its impact has been felt, too, on
religious questions. It has altered earlier
notions of church-state separation, drilling
new holes in Thomas Jefferson's
metaphorical wall preventing government
and religion from intruding on each other.
It would be wrong to conclude that
the current court always minimizes the
legal weight of personal liberties. The
court this term barred police from taking
reporters and photographers into
suspects' homes, struck down a federal
law prohibiting casino advertising,
knocked out a state law restricting
solicitations of signatures on petitions and
nullified a city ordinance that gave the
police broad leeway to arrest loiterers in
gang-infested neighborhoods.
"It's widely perceived that this is a
conservative Supreme Court (but) I think
this term suggested something to the
contrary -- that it is very much civil-
libertarian-oriented," said Theodore
Olson, a former official in the Reagan
administration's Justice Department who
analyzes Supreme Court developments.
In earlier years, the Rehnquist court
invalidated state laws that crippled
abortion rights, struck down a state
referendum that denied legal protections
to homosexuals and forced President
Clinton to face a woman's sexual-
harassment suit.
Struggling to find a unifying theme for
the court's seemingly disparate impulses,
Dellinger mused, "This is a court that
doesn't defer to any government. That
may be the heart of it."
Copyright C 1999 The Austin American-
Statesman
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SOME TARGETS WERE LARGER THAN OTHERS
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 4, 1999
Suzanna Sherry
By many measures, it was an unusual
term. The Supreme Court ruled on only
75 cases, the smallest number in the
modem era--and only half as many as it
routinely decided a decade ago. The
justices finished their work earlier than
they have in 30 years. There were no
blockbuster social policy cases sparked by
what have been called "the culture wars":
no abortion, no affirmative action, no gay
rights, no major free speech or religion
cases.
So what did the Supreme Court do?
Rather than striking down state legislation
violating the rights of individuals, it
invalidated federal legislation violating the
"rights" of states. And when it came to
enforcing other federal statutes, the court
interpreted ambiguous federal laws very
narrowly, further limiting Congress's
reach.
In the core areas of constitutional law
and the rights of criminal defendants, long
the mainstay of the docket, this term's
court merely tinkered at the margins,
striking down a statute here or upholding
a police practice there. But none of the
cases involved broad constitutional
doctrines, and all were so narrowly written
as to have almost no application beyond
the particular case.
Take for example Saenz v. Roe, a
California case testing limits on welfare
for new residents. The court held that it
was unconstitutional for California to
discriminate against individuals based on
how long they had been in the state (or
where they came from). But it was careful
to leave intact earlier holdings that allow
states to set lower fees for in-state
residents who attend their public
universities, or lower in-state fees for
certain types of licenses. So the California
ruling isn't likely to have much impact on
anything beyond welfare.
Or consider the court's invalidation of
a Chicago ordinance banning loitering by
gang members. The majority opinion in
Chicago v. Morales did not tackle the hard
questions about whether citizens have a
constitutional right to congregate on
public streets, or whether imposing special
restrictions on people because they are
suspected to be members of an
organization (a "gang")--even if they
cannot be shown to have committed any
otherwise illegal acts--is constitutional.
Instead, the court simply held that the
particular ordinance gave too much
discretion to police officers, and thus
virtually invited Chicago to rewrite its
ordinance with slightly more precision.
But this court, while apparently
reluctant to write broad decisions
condemning state and local actions, was
only too happy to cabin Congress's
power. The bulk of this term's cases fell
into one of two categories: Either the
court interpreted badly drafted and
confusing federal statutes, or it policed the
litigation process itself--often in the name
of federalism.
And although those categories sound
narrow and lawyerly, in fact many of the
court's decisions in those areas will likely
have broad ramifications. They are also
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evidence of both the dramatic expansion
in the number of federal laws and the
court's hostility toward Congress's
increasing activity.
That hostility was most evident in the
cases decided on the last day of the term
(June 23), striking down parts of several
congressional statutes as infringing upon
the sovereignty of the states. These
federalism cases were the latest examples
of a trend that began in 1992. After first
invalidating congressional attempts to deal
with nuclear waste (in New York v.
United States) and with guns in
schoolyards (in United States v. Lopez),
the court three years ago turned its
attention to Congress's power to subject
states to federal lawsuits.
Under a long-standing interpretation
of the Constitution, states are immune
from suit in federal court unless Congress
expressly revokes their immunity. In
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, a 1996 case
involving Indian casinos, the court for the
first time limited Congress's broad power
to revoke states' immunity from suit.
Congress is now permitted to subject the
states to suit only when it passes a statute
designed to enforce constitutional rights--
enforcing mere federal statutory rights
won't do. A year later, in City of Boerne v.
Flores, the case striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), the court narrowed the scope of
Congress's authority to determine what
laws might be necessary to enforce
constitutional rights.
Together, Seminole Tribe and City of
Boerne jeopardized many federal statutes
that purport to govern the states in their
capacity as employers, as market
participants and as service providers.
That possibility began to be realized
this term. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank, the court held
that Congress has no power to subject the
states to suit for patent infringement. This
ruling is likely to have serious
repercussions in such areas as copyright
law, where state universities--now chafing
under expanded copyright protection--
might decide to copy and distribute to
students whatever literature they wish,
ignoring the copyright laws but safe in the
knowledge that they cannot be sued.
An even more serious implication of
the court's ruling in the patent case is the
signal it sends about other federal statutes.
The court has already implicitly held that
states cannot be sued for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act--which sets the
minimum wage and governs things like
overtime pay. And the court has agreed to
hear a case next term about the validity of
Congress's attempt to make states liable
for violating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Cases challenging the
application to the states of the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA), the Family
and Medical Leave Act and other federal
laws are now working their way through
the federal courts. All of these laws are in
danger after this term, because the court
has indicated that it will allow Congress
little leeway in claims that the various
statutes are necessary to enforce
constitutional rights.
Thus it is quite likely that states can
violate federal law with impunity, because
their employees cannot bring suit in
federal court. 'Which takes us to the last
federalism case of the term, where the
court dropped the other shoe. What about
bringing suit in state court? In Alden v.
Maine, the court held that Congress has
no power to subject states to suits in their
own courts, either.
So state employees who have been
paid less than minimum wage--and maybe
those who have been discriminated
against because of their age or their
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disability--have no recourse. They have a
federal right, but no remedy, because they
cannot sue their employers anywhere at
all.
In keeping with its decisions limiting
Congress's power under the Constitution,
the court also generally interpreted
Congress's handiwork as narrowly as
possible. The cases arising under the ADA
offer an example. In the "Tuesday
Trilogy" (three separate ADA cases
decided on June 22), the court held that
people whose disabilities can be
corrected--by wearing eyeglasses or taking
medication, for example--are not
"disabled" within the meaning of the
statute. Thus an employer can refuse to
hire someone because he or she wears
glasses.
There were exceptions to the trend
toward narrow interpretation, of course,
but even they are not likely to have
significant impact. For example, despite all
the hype surrounding the court's decision
(in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education) that victims of student-to-
student sexual harassment can in some
cases bring suit--and despite the dissent's
insistence that the sky is falling--almost no
lawsuits will satisfy the very high hurdles
the court set for such cases: The
harassment has to be so egregious and
pervasive that it interferes with education,
and the school has to ignore complaints
about it.
The very fact that the bulk of the
court's docket involved the interpretation
of federal statutes rather than broad
constitutional questions tells us something
interesting. The court only interprets
federal statutes, not state statutes, and it
generally will only hear cases raising
serious disputes about the statutory
language. Too many statutes written with
too little care have meant that the courts
must resolve the ambiguities.
And perhaps those careless
congressional tentacles regulating more
aspects of life with greater detail have
contributed to the court's hostility toward
even justifiable congressional enactments.
Perhaps Congress's eagerness to enact
popular statutes without much concern
about either their clarity or their
constitutionality has increased the court's
mistrust of the federal legislature. Not
since the New Deal has the Supreme
Court confronted so many newly minted
federal statutes--and not since the New
Deal has the Supreme Court so
consistently set itself, and the
Constitution, against Congress.
Suzanna Sherry, who specializes in
constitutional law, is the Earl R. Larson
Professor of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Law at the University of
Minnesota.
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SUPREME COURT
The Justices Decide Who's in Charge
The New York Times
Sunday, June 27, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
THE Supreme Court rules.
That was the message of a term in
which the Court asserted its power over
every branch and level of government,
few of which emerged unchanged from
the encounter.
Most dramatically, the Court
reconfigured the Federal-state balance of
power in three decisions that carved out a
broad sphere of immunity for the states
from the reach of Federal law. Those
decisions had a subtext with even more
far-reaching implications, indicating the
Court's unwillingness to credit Congress's
own view not only of the way legislation
should be written but even of the
justification for Federal legislation at all in
areas where Congress has deemed it
preferable to stitch the states into a
uniform, nationwide rule of law.
Nor was the Court any more
solicitous of the executive branch,
rejecting the Clinton Administration's
plan for conducting the 2000 Census and
insisting that there was no alternative to
the traditional head count for
apportioning seats in the House of
Representatives. Looking to the states, the
Court invalidated California's two-tiered
welfare policy that disadvantaged new
arrivals, a policy the new Federal welfare
law had authorized. On the local level, the
Justices rejected Chicago's approach to
preventing gangs from taking over
neighborhoods.
"This is a Court that doesn't defer to
government at any level," Walter
Dellinger, an Acting Solicitor General
earlier in the Clinton Administration, said
the other day. "The Court is confident it
can come up with the right decisions, and
it believes it is constitutionally charged
with doing so."
It was the Court's lack of deference to
its ostensibly co-equal branches that was
most notable. In fact, at a time when
Congress and the executive branch have
appeared nearly paralyzed by partisan
stalemate and by their own internal
weaknesses, one could alrnost feel
governmental power in Washington
flowing in the Court's direction.
"The Court makes decisions," one
Federal judge, surveying the scene from a
courthouse far from Washington,
observed recently, "and a willingness to
actually make decisions puts you in stark
contrast with all the people who just talk
about it."
The Court did not make many
decisions: only 75, half the number of
cases decided each term in the rmid-1980's,
and the June 23 end of the term was the
earliest closing date in 30 years. But the
cases the Justices did choose from among
some 7,000 petitions for review were
arrayed along society's pressure points,
from police authority to questions of
discrimination, citizenship and disability
rights. The term that begins next October
promises, if anything, to be even more
intense, with a resumption of the
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federalism debate in at least three new
cases and with religion also added to the
mix in the form of a case on aid to
parochial schools. There will also be a
major test of the Court's willingness to
defer to the executive branch when it
decides whether the Food and Drug
Administration has authority to regulate
tobacco products.
The term was a triumph for Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who after
27 years on the Court, 13 of those as
Chief Justice, is stamping his deeply held
vision of state sovereignty on the Court's
jurisprudence. As the federalism debate
has waxed and waned over the years, he
has never diverted his attention from his
goal of curtailing the national
Government's authority over the states,
and he appears on the verge of succeeding
to a degree that would have seemed
implausible only a few years ago.
Of the three federalism decisions
handed down on the term's final day, the
Chief Justice's majority opinion holding
states immune from suits for patent
infringement was the most blandly written
and appeared narrowly cast. But beneath
its mild tone, it was aggressively far-
reaching. In rejecting Congress's factual
premises for having made states liable for
patent infringement in the first place, the
opinion assumed for the Court a veto
power beyond any it has exercised in
modern times. The Court flatly declared
that Congress lacked a sufficient reason
for enacting the patent law.
"The Court is telling Congress, 'We
think it's not as necessary as you
apparently do, so you lose,' " Professor
Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School
said in an interview. "It's a complete lack
of deference."
The only shadow over the ascendant
states'-rights majority is the narrowness of
its hold on the Court. The three cases
were all decided by 5-to-4 votes, an
alignment that now seems to admit of no
compromise or middle ground. Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas joined the Chief Justice's
majority, while Justices John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer made up the
dissent. Strikingly, the dissenters vowed
never to yield -- as Chief Justice Rehnquist
did himself when he was on the losing end
of the same debate half a generation ago.
The alignment reflected in the
federalism cases held true in most of the
Court's closely fought cases -- actually,
and typically, a rather small subset of the
docket. Thirty-four of the term's cases, or
45 percent, were decided by 9-0 votes,
unanimous in outcome if not always in
reasoning. Only 16 -- 21 percent -- were
decided by votes of 5 to 4, a group that
included some important civil rights and
criminal procedure cases as well as the
decision barring statistical sampling for
the Census.
Of those 16 cases, 14 found the four
most liberal Justices -- Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer -- arrayed against the
three most conservative, the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Thomas. That left
the outcome up to Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, the Justices statistically in the
middle of the Court (as indicated by the
fact that over the course of the term, each
dissented only 8 times, the fewest of any
Justice, compared with 14 dissenting votes
by Justice Thomas, to their right, and 20
dissenting votes by Justice Stevens, to
their left.)
In the 5-to-4 cases, Justice O'Connor
voted with the conservative bloc 10 times
and the more liberal group 4 times; Justice
Kennedy's split was 12 to 2. The
conservative group prevailed in 8 of the
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14 cases that reflected a clear ideological
split.
Ideological labels on this Court can be
quite misleading. Liberalism on the Court
is a relative concept, as demonstrated by
the Court's decision during the term that
the Government may select aliens for
deportation on the basis of their political
views. While the vote was 6 to 3, with
Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer
dissenting, their dissents were aimed not
at the constitutional merits of the Court's
rejection of the selective-enforcement
claim but rather at the narrower issue of
whether the Court should have addressed
that part of the case at all after earlier
indicating that it would not do so.
Immigration law, in fact, is one area where
the Court retains a posture of deference
toward administrative enforcement
decisions.
And Justices across the spectrum
remain committed to free speech
principles. A First Amendment decision
striking down a Federal prohibition of
broadcast advertising for casino gambling
was unanimous.
Five cases under the Americans With
Disabilities Act illustrated the Court's role
in construing acts of Congress, a job the
Justices view as distinct from interpreting
the Constitution. Reading the disabilities
law narrowly to exclude coverage of
people with correctable impairments like
nearsightedness and high blood pressure,
the 7-to-2 majority put great weight on
Congress's calculation that 43 million
Americans have disabilities. In the
majority opinon ,Justice O'Connor noted
that 160 million people have disabilities,
most of them correctable, so Congress
could not have meant to include them all.
Justices Stevens and Breyer said in dissent
that Congress's figure should be taken as
illustrative of the problem the statute was
supposed to address rather than a
limitation on its scope.
There was a reminder at the end of
the term that for all the Court's activism,
it is no more than the passive recipient of
the problems and issues that people bring
to its door.
For years now, the Court has been
trying to decide whether Section 1981,
one of the Reconstruction-era civil rights
laws, prohibits discrimination against
aliens in the making of private contracts.
A case the Justices granted five years ago
to resolve the question had to be
dismissed when the lawsuit was settled.
Two months ago, after weeks of internal
debate over the constitutional
ramifications of this issue, the Court
selected another case and scheduled it for
argument in October. But the parties in
that case, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters v. Anderson, then settled their
dispute, and as its final act before
beginning the summer recess, the Court
announced that this case had been
dismissed as well.
Following are summaries of the major
cases.
States Get Protection From an Array of
Lawsuits
In a trio of decisions, all by the same
5-to-4 vote, the Court invoked a broad
principle of sovereign immunity to shield
states from suit for violations of Federal
law. The Court struck down two Federal
laws, both enacted in 1992 to authorize
suits against states for violations of
Federal patent and trademark laws. The
Justices also overturned a 3 5-year-old
precedent under which states that entered
the commercial marketplace - in that case,
by running a railroad - were regarded as
having waived their immunity from suit
for their activities there.
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In each of the three cases, those in the
majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas. The dissenters were Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
One of the cases, Alden v. Maine, No.
98-436, held in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy that states could not be sued in
their own courts by state employees for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Since the Justices had made it clear in
a 1996 decision, Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, that such suits could not be
brought in Federal court, the decision left
state employees without recourse when
they believe their rights under Federal
labor law have been violated. The Federal
Government itself can still sue on a state
employee's behalf, but the Department of
Labor is not equipped to bring more than
a token number of such lawsuits on behalf
of the 4.7 million people in the country
who work for state governments.
The other two federalism cases grew
out of lawsuits by the College Savings
Bank, based in Princeton, N.J., against the
state of Florida, a competitor in the
marketplace for investment funds for
college tuition. The College Savings Bank
charged Florida with false advertising of
the state program, in violation of Federal
trademark law, and with infringing its
patent on its investment program. An
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank,
No. 98-531, held that the states are
immune from patent infringement suits,
while Justice Scalia wrote for the majority
in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid, No. 98-149, that states are also
immune from trademark suits.
Clinton Administration Loses on Census
Rejecting the Clinton Administration's
plan to conduct the 2000 Census with the
help of statistical sampling, the Court
ruled by a 5-to-4 vote that the Census Act
made the traditional head count
mandatory for the figures that will be used
to apportion the House of
Representatives. The Court indicated that
statistical adjustments may be made for
the other purposes of the Census,
including state redistricting and the
distribution of Federal money.
Justice O'Connor wrote for the
majority in Department of Commerce v.
U.S. House of Representatives, No. 98-
404. The dissenters were Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
On Criminal Law Issues, Some Reining In
of Authority
The Court struck down a Chicago
anti-loitering ordinance that was aimed at
preventing gang members from
controlling neighborhood streets. The law
authorized the police to arrest anyone
who, refusing a police order to move on,
remained "in one place with no apparent
purpose" in the presence of a suspected
gang member. Voting 6 to 3 in Chicago v.
Morales, No. 97-1121, the Court said the
ordinance gave too much discretion to the
police to target innocent people. Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion.
Justice Scalia dissented, along with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
In a case growing out of an
independent counsel's prosecution of
Mike Espy, the Clinton Administration's
former Secretary of Agriculture, the Court
ruled unanimously that giving gifts to a
Federal official does not violate the law
against illegal gratuities unless there is a
demonstrated connection between the
gifts and the official's actions. Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion in United States
v. Sun-diamond, No. 98-131, which
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rejected the independent counsel's
expansive theory of the gratuity statute.
There were several cases dealing with
police behavior and raising questions of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches.
Among these was the Court's unanimous
ruling that the police violate "the right of
residential privacy at the core of the
Fourth Amendment" when they take
journalists and photographers into
people's homes to witness searches or
arrests. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
opinion in Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83.
In another search case, the Court
ruled, 5 to 4, that people who are
temporarily in a private home to conduct
business there may not challenge the
validity of a search of the home, because
they themselves have no "legitimate
expectation of privacy" there. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in Minnesota v. Carter, No. 97-
1147. Justice Ginsburg dissented, along
with Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy
suggested that a social guest, rather than
someone doing business, would be able to
challenge a search.
Two search cases concerned
automobiles. The Court ruled
unanimously, in another opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, that issuing a speeding
ticket does not automatically give the
police the authority to search the car. The
case was Knowles v. Iowa, No. 97-7597.
At the same time, the Court also ruled
that once the police do have probable
cause to search a car, they can search the
personal belongings -- in this case, a
pocketbook -- of passengers who are
themselves under no suspicion of illegal
activity. The vote in Wyoming v.
Houghton, No. 98-184, was 6 to 3. Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion, and
justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg
dissented.
Voting 5 to 4, the Court upheld the
first death sentence to come before it
under the new, greatly expanded Federal
death penalty law, rejecting a challenge to
the jury instructions along with other
issues. Justice Thomas wrote the majority
opinion in Jones v. U.S., No. 97-9361,
with dissenting votes by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
In Disability Cases, A Narrower
Definition
In a series of three cases, all decided
by the same 7-to-2 vote, the Court took a
restrictive view of the definition of
disability under the Americans With
Disabilities Act. People whose
impairments can be alleviated by
medication, glasses or other devices are
generally not disabled and so do not come
under the law's protection against
employment discrimination, the Court
said.
In two of the cases, the disability
claims the Court rejected were based on
vision problems. Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion in Sutton v. United
Air Lines, No. 97-1943, finding that two
nearsighted sisters, with vision correctable
to 20/20, were not disabled despite the
airline's refusal to hire them because of
their vision. In Albertsons Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, No. 98-591, Justice Souter
wrote for the majority, rejecting a
discrimination claim by a truck driver who
was dismissed because he was functionally
blind in one eye. In Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, No. 97-1992, Justice
O'Connor wrote for the majority that an
employer did not discriminate by
dismissing a truck driver whose high
blood pressure prevented him from
obtaining Federal certification to drive a
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truck. Justice Stevens and Breyer dissented
in these cases.
Resolving a separate issue under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the
Court ruled, 6 to 3, that isolating people
with disabilities in big state institutions
when there is no medical reason for their
confinement is a form of discrimination.
This decision, Olmstead v. L.C., No. 98-
536, did not require states to move
patients en masse into group homes, but
said that states should have a plan for
doing so at a "reasonable pace" when
medically appropriate and not unduly
disruptive to the state's budget. Justice
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, with
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist voting in dissent.
Interpreting another Federal law, the
Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act, the Court ruled that students with
disabilities who require special care during
the school day are entitled to the care at
public expense, as long as a doctor is not
required to deliver the necessary services.
The vote in Cedar Rapids v. Garrett F.,
No. 96-1793, was 7 to 2. Justice Stevens
wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Thomas and Kennedy dissented.
The Court ruled unanimously that a
worker who has applied for or received
disability benefits under Social Security is
not barred by that fact from suing an
employer for discrimination under the
Americans With Disabilities Act. Justice
Breyer wrote the opinion in Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems, No. 97-
1008, which reconciled an apparent
conflict in the two laws: Social Security,
which provides benefits to those too
disabled to work, and the disabilities law,
which protects those who can work if
provided with reasonable
accommodations.
For the Harassed and the Poor, A
Strengthening of Rights
Interpreting the Federal law that bars
sex discrimination in schools, the Court
ruled 5 to 4 that school districts can be
liable for damages for failing to stop one
student from subjecting another to severe
and pervasive sexual harassment. Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in
Davis v. Monroe County, No. 97-843.
Justice Kennedy dissented, along with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas.
The Court ruled that state welfare
programs may not restrict new residents
to the welfare benefits they would have
received in their home states. The 7-to-2
decision, Saenz v. Roe, No. 98-97, had the
effect of overturning a portion of the new
Federal welfare law, which authorized
states to set up two-tiered benefit systems.
The opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
was also significant for its reliance on the
long-ignored Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the 14th Amendment, a possible
signal that this provision, which provides
that "no state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United
States," could become a new source of
protection for individual rights. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
dissented.
A unanimous opinion, the latest to
examine a much-disputed Congressional
district in North Carolina, held that
district lines drawn primarily for political
reasons are not invalid simply because
they are drawn with a consciousness of
the district's racial composition. The
decision, Hunt v. Cromartie, No. 98-85,
overturned a judgment that North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District,
which is heavily Democratic and 47
percent black, was an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander. Justice Thomas's
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majority opinion appeared to give the
states some breathing room as they
prepare for the post-2000 round of
redistricting.
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held
that companies making "good faith
efforts" to comply with Federal anti-
discrimination laws will not be liable for
punitive damages, even if a senior official
intentionally violates company policy and
the law. The decision, Kolstad v.
American Dental Association, No. 98-208,
interpreted a 1991 amendment to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which for the first
time authorized awards of punitive
damages for intentional job
discrimination. Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion, from which Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
dissented.
Casinos and, Voter Initiatives Win on
Free Speech Grounds
The Justices unanimously struck down
a 65-year-old Federal ban on broadcast
advertising of casino gambling. Writing
for the Court in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Assoc. v. U.S., No. 98-387,
Justice Stevens said the law "sacrifices an
intolerable amount of truthful speech
about lawful conduct."
In a 6-to-3 decision extolling the First
Amendment value of uninhibited
"communication with voters," the Court
struck down Colorado's restrictions on
the process of getting initiatives on the
ballot. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority
opinion in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, No. 97-
930, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Breyer dissented.
Among the regulations the decision
invalidated were requirements that people
circulating petitions be registered
Colorado voters and wear badges
identifying themselves by name.
Immigration Cases Mean More Authority
for Government
An area in which the Court gave
considerable deference to the
Government was immigration law, with
the Court sharing Congress's and the
Administration's narrow view of the rights
of non-citizens. The Court ruled, 6 to 3, in
a deportation case involving a group of
Palestinians in Los Angeles, that the
Government does not violate the
Constitution by selecting aliens for
deportation based on their political views
and associations. Justice Scalia wrote the
majority opinion in Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
No. 97-1252, with Justices Ginsburg,
Souter and Breyer dissenting.
In a second deportation case the
Court ruled unanimously that foreigners
who have committed serious crimes in
their home countries are ineligible for
refugee status here regardless of the risk
of persecution they face if deported.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre, No.
97-1754, upheld the Clinton
Administration's view of how a would-be
refugee's criminal past should be
evaluated.
In Business-Consumer Cases Rulings for
Both Sides
Among a number of important
business cases, the Court limited much of
the Federal Communications
Commission's authority to supervise
telephone deregulation under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion in
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, No.
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97-826. The vote was 5 to 3, with Justices
Souter, Thomas and Breyer dissenting and
Justice O'Connor not participating.
A unanimous opinion on the use of
expert testimony was a substantial victory
for defendants in product liability suits. In
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709,
the Court gave Federal judges new
authority to keep expert testimony of
questionable reliability away from juries.
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion.
In an important ruling on how thejudicial system should handle class action
lawsuits in mass tort cases, the Court set
aside a $1.5-billion settlement in an
asbestos suit, covering some 186,000
claims, on the ground that it was unfair to
other asbestos victims, and was the
product of a possible conflict of interest
on the part of the lawyers who designed
and settled the case. The vote in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 97-1704, was 7 to
2. Justice Souter wrote the majority





Because of an editing error, an article
last Sunday about the Supreme Court
term that ended in June characterized one
Court opinion incorrectly. In a case
involving the Federal Communications
Commission, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, the Court upheld the
F.C.C.'s authority to supervise telephone
deregulation under a 1996 Federal law. It
limited the agency's authority in some
other respects.
Copyright ©1999 The New York Times
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COURT'S QUARTET OF DISSENT
Justices Favor Pragmatism Over Liberalism
The Washington Post
Sunday, June 27, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Reporter
One of the most important rituals in the
grand white marble and red velvet setting of
the Supreme Court is the announcement of
a decision and naming of the justices who
agree with it-and those who don't. As the
Supreme Court term ended last week, four
names were a refrain of dissent, often
recited with a hint of weariness at their
recurrence: "Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer."
This is the foursome fighting the bold
conservatism of the Rehnquist majority.
These are the liberal stalwarts of the bench.
Except they're not.
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer are Exhibit A for the changing
face of liberalism in America. The term that
ended last week showed more than ever that
while these three men and one woman
stand to the left of the potent majority bloc,
they do not stand for judicial liberalism as it
was known even a decade ago, when the
justices trying to block the newly
consolidated Rehnquist majority were
William J. Brennan Jr., Harry A. Blackmun,
Thurgood Marshall, and Stevens-then the
most conservative of the four.
"This is a court without any liberals,"
said University of Chicago law professor
Cass Sunstein, adding that, for better or
worse, "no one believes in using the
Constitution as a weapon for social reform."
The changes in the court mirror the
broader changes in American politics over
the last two decades. The wave of public
dissatisfaction that brought Ronald
Reagan to the presidency in 1980
trickled down to the judiciary through
12 years of GOP appointments. By the
time Bill Clinton was elected in 1992,
the Democratic Party had responded to
the national move to the right by
divesting itself of many of its more
liberal elements. Accordingly, Clinton's
appointees have hewed to a moderate
path.
This reality is reflected in the
justices' bottom-line rulings, as well as in
the principles they articulate and the
rhetoric they employ-which today
rarely dwells on the plight of the weak,
poor or socially scorned of America.
These four justices are concerned
with legal authority, rather than social
ideals. They have a broader vision of the
Constitution and federal law than the
Rehnquist conservatives, to be sure, but
rather than expressing an overarching
judicial philosophy, they tend to take
cases as they come. Pragmatism is their
watchword. And unlike both yesterday's
liberals-who believed the court should
intervene in society's most pressing
dilemmas-and today's conservatives-
who would consistently prefer to scale
back government-these justices
generally take the path of least
intervention, deciding cases narrowly
and avoiding broad mandates.
The actual votes of Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer in recent cases tell
much of the story: When the court
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upheld the death penalty for a Virginia
killer, despite the prosecution's holding back
key evidence that the court acknowledged
might have spared the man, Stevens wrote
the opinion and Ginsburg and Breyer joined
it.
When the justices curtailed the scope of
federal law protecting disabled workers
from discrimination, Souter and Ginsburg
signed on. And when the majority limited
the First Amendment rights of illegal aliens,
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer were with
them to a considerable degree. Only Souter
dissented.
Even when the four justices did band
together to vote against the conservative
majority's judgment, they were heavy on
legal precedent, light on overarching
principle or moral outrage.
Last week, for example, the conservative
majority of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas declared
that a company sued for sex or race
discrimination because of a manager's
misconduct doesn't have to pay punitive
damages if the company had made a "good
faith" effort to follow civil rights laws. The
ruling came out of the blue: The case in
question hadn't focused on that particular
issue and neither side in the job-bias fight
had been asked to present arguments on it.
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
complained that the standard was
"ill-advised," but on procedural grounds-
they were unhappy the question hadn't been
covered in legal briefs. It was in decided
contrast to the passion of dissenting justices
exactly 10 years ago when a narrow majority
similarly restricted the reach of civil rights
job protections, and Blackmun let loose an
emotional tirade questioning whether the
majority even realized race discrimination
still existed.
Also last week, the five-justice
majority upheld the death sentence of a
Texas murderer despite mistakes in the
judge's instructions to the jury. The
four-justice dissent copiously detailed
the procedural flaws in the case. But
reflecting the reality that not a single
member of this bench disapproves of
capital punishment, the dissent was
devoid of outrage at the ultimate
penalty.
The contrast of then-and-now
liberalism was especially obvious this
term because the court revisited legal
disputes from prior decades.
When all four on the left voted, with
O'Connor and Kennedy, to strike down
a Chicago ordinance against loitering by
suspected gang members, the
straightforward opinion by Stevens
emphasized that the law lacked adequate
guidance for police officers. Absent
were the lofty social ideals of Justice
William 0. Douglas, who in a 1972
opinion striking down a Jacksonville,
Fla., vagrancy ordinance, quoted Walt
Whitman on the value of "wandering or
strolling."
In 1969, when the court struck
down state laws and a District statute
setting residence requirements for
welfare families, the majority relied on a
loosely defined "right to travel" and an
open-ended constitutional analysis
favoring individual rights.
Ringing with concern for the human
needs of food and shelter, the opinion
by Brennan stated, "[W]e do not
perceive why a mother who is seeking to
make a new life for herself and her
children should be regarded as less
deserving because she considers, among
other factors, the level of a state's public
assistance."
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This year, by contrast, when the court
threw out a California law that stopped new
residents from getting full welfare benefits
for a year, the majority opinion-written by
Stevens and joined by Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, as well as O'Connor, Scalia and
Kennedy-spurned Brennan's expansive
reasoning, grounding the ruling instead in a
specific provision of the 14th Amendment
supported by those across the ideological
landscape: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."
One need not reach back a
quarter-century to see change in the tenor
of the court. Just 10 years ago, the court's
minority bloc of Brennan, Blackmun,
Marshall and Stevens vigorously promoted a
liberal, interventionist agenda. Brennan and
Marshall in particular embraced the idea that
constitutional rights expanded with the
years. They were driven by an activist vision
that judges could correct society's ills.
Brennan, who joined the court in 1956
and was both the pen and the persuasive
force behind the Warren Court ideals,
retired in 1990, replaced by the low-key
intellectual Souter. Marshall, the nation's
first black justice, stepped down in 1991,
succeeded by Thomas, the nation's second.
Blackmun left the court in 1994, and
President Clinton replaced him with Breyer,
a moderate. A year earlier, when
right-leaning Justice Byron R. White had
retired, Clinton had appointed Ginsburg, a
centrist on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
As much as Stevens, Souter, Breyer and
Ginsburg might want the nation to address
the plight of the poor and disenfranchised,
as a group they believe that mission rests
with the legislature, not the bench.
Where the four do show their teeth is in
the fight over the structure of government.
When the five conservatives gave more
power to the states at the expense of
Congress last week, the four dissenters
criticized the majority in exceptionally
strong language, describing the ruling as
"indefensible" and destined to be
"fleeting." But the evident source of
their outrage was not that the decision
would have terrible consequences for
Americans, but rather that it was lacking
in constitutional authority.
"Liberals are a vanishing breed in
American life generally," asserted
Columbia University law professor
Michael Dorf. "The Clinton justices
represent the liberal left of the
Rehnquist Court, just as they represent
the liberal left of American politics."
Dorf, who served as a law clerk to
Kennedy, and Sunstein, who once
clerked for Marshall, say the absence of
a strong liberal voice is a loss for
constitutional debate.
"Even for those like me who don't
agree with [old-fashioned liberalism],"
Sunstein said, "having a liberal voice
would illuminate the issues, see them
sharply defined. When Brennan or
Marshall would lose a case, they would
write and stake out the boundary."
The Court Makes Its Mark
The following are among the major
cases from the 1998-99 term.
Disabilities Law
* Sutton v. United Airlines
The Americans with Disabilities Act
does not cover people whose disabilities
can be sufficiently corrected with
medicine, eyeglasses or other measures.
(also, Murphy v. United Parcel Service)
* Albertsons v. Kirkingburg
Employers who set job
qualifications based on federal safety
standards are not required to dispense
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with those standards when a worker obtains
a waiver from the federal agency.
* Olmstead v. L.C.
States must place certain mentally
disabled people in community homes rather
than hospitals; it is illegal discrimination to
segregate the mentally ill simply because of
their disabilities.
Schools
* Davis v. Monroe County School Board
Schools that receive federal funds may
be held liable and forced to pay damages for
student sexual harassment.
* Cedar Rapids School District v. Garret F.
Public schools must provide a wide
array of medical care for disabled children
attending classes, under a federal law
intended to improve the educational
prospects for the disabled.
State and Federal Governments
* Alden v. Maine
Individuals cannot sue states for
violating rights guaranteed them by federal
law; the Constitution's history and structure
shields states from lawsuits in both state and
federal courts. (also, College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education;
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education v.
College Savings Bank)
* Saenz v. Roe
States may not limit welfare benefits for
new residents; the justices struck down a
California law that restricted newcomers'
welfare checks for one year to the amount
they had collected in their previous state.
* Department of Commerce v. U.S. House
of Representatives
Federal law prevents the Census Bureau
from supplementing its traditional
procedure for trying to reach every
household with statistical estimates that
would be used to determine the nation's
population and divide seats in Congress
among the states.
First Amendment
* Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation
A state may not require people who
circulate petitions for ballot initiatives to
wear identification badges, be registered
voters in the state or be subject to
requirements on how much they were
paid to collect signatures.
* Greater New Orleans Broadcasting v.
United States
A federal law restricting broadcast
advertising by casinos, riddled with
exceptions for other gambling
enterprises, violates the First
Amendment.
* Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee
People here unlawfully cannot shield
themselves from deportation by
claiming the government is trying to
banish them simply because of their
controversial political views.
Criminal Law
* Chicago v. Morales
Cities cannot arbitrarily prevent
people suspected of being gang
members from loitering in public; a
Chicago anti-loitering ordinance
unconstitutionally failed to draw a line
between innocent and harmful
hanging-out.
* United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California
It is not a crime to provide public
officials with gifts or free meals unless
they are aimed at rewarding a specific
action by the official.
* Jones v. United States
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Under the new federal death penalty,
jurors considering punishment for a
murderer need not be told that if they fail to
agree on a death sentence or life
imprisonment, the judge will mandate a life
sentence rather than some lesser penalty.
Business
* Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
Trial judges must ensure that testimony
from all experts is relevant and reliable
before it reaches a jury, enhancing the
power of judges to screen out dubious
expert testimony.
* AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board
The Federal Communications
Commission has authority to set pricing
rules for opening local telephone markets to
competition.
THE CONSERVATIVES
* William H. Rehnquist, 74
Appointed in 1971 by Nixon
* Sandra Day O'Connor, 69
Appointed in 1981 by Reagan
* Antonin Scalia, 63
Appointed in 1986 by Reagan
* Anthony M. Kennedy, 62
Appointed in 1988 by Reagan
* Clarence Thomas, 51
Appointed in 1991 by Bush
THE 'LIBERALS'
* John Paul Stevens, 79
Appointed in 1975 by Ford
* David H. Souter, 59
Appointed in 1990 by Bush
* Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 66
Appointed in 1993 by Clinton
* Stephen G. Breyer, 60
Appointed in 1994 by Clinton




The Best Show in America, Comedy or Drama, Plays at the Supreme
Court
The Wall Street Journal
Fiday, July 2,1999
David Andrew Price
Under the Supreme Court's
red-and-blue coffered ceiling, a young
lawyer is defending a client on death row.
The lawyer maintains that the defendant,
convicted of killing a woman with a
69-pound boulder, was deprived of due
process.
Justice Antonin Scalia, sounding
unpersuaded, asks the lawyer whether the
inmate's arguments should have been
presented to the state courts first. The
lawyer begins to answer formally, "With
all due respect, that is not actually correct.
It was a claim " Justice Scalia then jumps
in. "You don't have to give me any
respect. I just want an answer to my
question!"
With the recent end of the Supreme
Court's latest term, the venue of the best
tax-funded public entertainment in
Washington has closed for the summer.
Fourteen weeks a year, three mornings a
week, the justices hear oral arguments
from the country's great and
less-than-great attorneys. From the
moment the justices enter from behind
the curtain, the sessions take on the
atmosphere of great theater.
Or maybe great situation comedy.
Where a stage play typically ends with its
characters transformed (Hamlet is alive in
Act I, dead in Act V), the characters in a
sitcom stay much the same from week to
week. Supreme Court arguments are like
that, too. Rarely does a week go by
without a joking reference to Justice
Scalia's distaste for legislative history. Also
routine are sly allusions to the monthly
poker game in which Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia participate.
And unlike the stages of New York
and London's West End -- but as at the
TV studios of Burbank and Culver City --
the Supreme Court's arguments are timed
down to the second. The lawyer who
misses the red light on the lectern when
his 30 minutes are up gets a crisp "thank
you" from Chief Justice Rehnquist. (For
the rare bird who tries to keep going even
after that, the chief justice is ready with a
gruff "your time has expired.")
On the whole, the justices function as
an ensemble cast. They may have banned
TV cameras from the courtroom, but you
can still get a good idea of their roles by
watching the right network shows.
Justice Scalia, the court's resident
cutup, is Bart Simpson without the
skateboard. To the lawyer who's reluctant
to suggest a precise legal test, he exclaims,
"Make us an offer!" In a case on junk
expert testimony, he posits a jury
instruction: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is
an expert. He has this cockamamie theory
that contradicts common sense." As the
court mulls a vague international treaty,
Justice Scalia asks: "How many smart
people from how many countries came up
with this formulation?" When a lawyer
can't get through the four points of his
argument, thanks to interruptions from
the bench, Justice Scalia explains, "Our
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attention span is really not that long."
There's Justice John Paul Stevens, a
genial Ford appointee, who tends to
perceive horizontal at about a 15-degree
tilt from everyone else: He's Cosmo
Kramer. Pondering a First Amendment
lawsuit against a public TV station,
brought by a minor candidate who had
been excluded from a debate, Justice
Stevens asks about the "format" of the
debate and inquires, "How many
journalists were there?" Interesting
questions, perhaps, but Kramerian all the
same.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor may be
a cheery soul in her chambers, but on the
bench she's the easily annoyed Ling Woo
of "Ally McBeal." Her questions and
comments are served with a side dish of
steamed asperity. "Well, don't complicate
it," she chides a lawyer in a patent case.
Soon after, she complains, "I thought you
had told me earlier that the on-sale
provision requires a delivery. Now you're
telling me it can be something else. You
need to settle on something, probably."
"Well, Your Honor - " the lawyer
begins.
"Consistently," Justice O'Connor
adds, landing hard on the second syllable.
"I did not mean to say 'on sale'
required delivery," the lawyer says,
meekly.
"I thought that's what you did tell
me," Justice O'Connor answers, her pique
mounting. "We talked about that."
The bookish Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg plays Lisa Simpson to Justice
Scalia's bad-boy Bart, regularly taking the
role of truth cop with the Clinton Justice
Department. In one case, a government
lawyer told the justices that President
Zachary Taylor couldn't have meant to
revoke part of an 1837 Indian treaty
because the tribe wouldn't have been able
to hunt and fish. "In the brief twice, I
noticed," Justice Ginsburg says pointedly,
"you said that would be taking away their
sustenance -- but that's wrong, isn't it?"
When the lawyer responds that the
Indians' rights were unclear, she shoots
back: "You didn't say anything about it
not being clear. You said the Chippewa
could not have survived."
Justices Anthony Kennedy and
Stephen Breyer, meanwhile, are the Bob
Newharts of the court, regular guys trying
to make their way through a crazy world.
Then there are the lawyers -- the guest
stars. It's fun to see them adroitly field the
justices' questions, and even more fun to
watch them crash and burn. Gilbert
Davis, representing Paula Jones in her
fateful lawsuit, puzzled the court by
conceding much of what President
Clinton wanted: According to Mr. Davis,
Mr. Clinton could suspend the lawsuit just
by saying he was too busy. "It seems to
me you give away most of your case,"
Justice Kennedy observed. (As history
records, Jones won 9-0 anyway.)
Questions usually come fast and
furious, and the justices do not accept
facile soundbite answers. In politics, a
zero-content statement may pass for an
argument. ("It's all about our children.")
Any lawyer who tried that in the Supreme
Court would soon become Twinkies
flambee.
For the justices, a lack of preparation
and a lack of clear thinking on the lawyer's
part is a form of disrespect for the court --
a mortal sin. That attitude is heartening: It
shows that the justices, although
sometimes self- indulgent on the bench,
still know that the late-20th-century cults
of informality, celebrity and hollow
posturing would degrade the court if they
got a foothold there.
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And oral arguments do serve
worthwhile purposes, even if they seldom
sway the ultimate ruling. They force the
justices to spend an hour focusing on just
one case, whether its philosophical stakes
are high or not. What's more, the face-
to-face sessions let the justices and the
lawyers engage one another in a way that
briefs alone never could. And most
important, the sessions remind the justices
that their job isn't to reshape society
wisely: It's to decide disputes between
litigants who have a beef with each other.
That alone makes oral arguments
invaluable, no matter how much they
resemble a sitcom.
Mr. Price, a legal writer in Washington,
attended 18 arguments during the court's
latest term.




Rare, Loud and Clear
The Washington Post
Monday, July 5, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Justice Benjamin Cardozo once
compared a judge who dissents in a case to
a gladiator making a last stand against the
lions. At the Supreme Court, where voices
are rarely raised and restraint is the norm, a
fierce dissent can be a mighty sword. The
more so when done from the court's
elevated mahogany bench.
Six times this term, various justices
disagreed with the majority so strongly that
they chose to make their points out loud, in
public and with flourish.
When the court struck down a Chicago
ordinance prohibiting gang loitering, Justice
Antonin Scalia said in a scalding dissent: "I
would trade my right to loiter ... in return
for the liberation of my neighborhood in an
instant."
On the last day of the 1998-99 term,
when a majority said private individuals
couldn't sue states over violations of federal
rights, Justice John Paul Stevens accused the
court of crafting a doctrine "much like a
mindless dragon that indiscriminately chews
gaping holes" in federal laws. That last
morning of the term, June 23, produced an
extraordinary hour of statements from the
bench, including dissents by Justices David
H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer.
Traditionally only the author of the
majority opinion delivers excerpts and a
dissenting justice leaves his or her remarks
for the written documents. But increasingly
justices have been voicing their contrary
views. Because it's a break from the usual
pattern and a demand for special
attention, it is not a path for the timid.
MAKE IT DRAMATIC: A decade
ago when the justices by one vote struck
down a Texas statute against flag
burning, Stevens, a Navy veteran and
Bronze star winner, dissented, evoking
memories of "the soldiers who scaled
the bluff at Omaha Beach."
The year before, in 1988, when
Scalia was the only dissent against
upholding the independent counsel law,
he spoke passionately for 10 minutes.
"By its shortsighted action today, I fear
the court has permanently encumbered
the Republic with an institution that will
do it great harm," he declared.
When the majority ruled this past
May that students can sue schools for
sexual harassment, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy predicted that schools would
be hit by an "avalanche" of lawsuits and
said the ruling would teach "little
Johnny" a bad lesson. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, the author of the
majority opinion, had offered a
preemptive rejoinder: No, the ruling
would make sure "that little Mary may
attend class."
Harry A. Blackmun was one justice
who did not shy from revealing his
emotions, and in 1993 he declared, "The
execution of a person who can show
that he is innocent comes perilously
close to simple murder" when the
majority ruled federal judges are not
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required to halt the executions of Death
Row inmates who've exhausted their
appeals and then claim new evidence of
innocence.
INVOKE HISTORY: "The court today
holds for the first time since the founding
of the Republic. . ." Souter proclaimed in
the 1996 case that was a prelude to this
term's states' rights cases. This time around,
when Souter dissented, his distinct Yankee
voice could not have been firmer when he
declared the majority flat wrong.
In 1991, when the majority said criminal
defendants may sometimes be convicted
even if their confessions were coerced,
Justice Byron R. White proclaimed, "Today,
a majority of the court, without any
justification, overrules .. . vast body of
precedent." White's thunder was especially
remarkable because he had a reputation for
the tersest announcements even on majority
opinions.
PREDICT DIRE CONSEQUENCES:
In 1994, when the majority ruled that judges
could stop demonstrators from closely
approaching abortion clinics on public
sidewalks, Scalia angrily asserted that the
court "has left a powerful loaded weapon
lying about today" to suppress all sorts
of important protest.
When the court invalidated a
Georgia redistricting plan in 1995,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said from
the bench it would create endless
litigation and perilous results. Two years
later, when O'Connor dissented out
loud from a ruling striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, she
emphasized how an earlier ruling-
which the 1993 act was intended to
reverse-was an affront to those who
wanted to freely exercise their religious
faith.
WHY DO THEY DO IT? Justice
Stevens once said he read a dissent from
the bench because he didn't want his
views to get lost in the shuffle of the
day's news.
Sometimes a dissent is simply the
best way to have one's say, despite the
loss. "The right to dissent," Justice
William 0. Douglas once said, "is the
only thing that makes life tolerable."





Friday, July 2, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Much has been made about the
Supreme Court's critical 5 to 4 split and
how the next president likely will be able
to name new justices who could tip that
balance of power. While that's true, one
can't always judge an appointee by the
president who chooses him. Witness the
differences in President George Bush's
two high court appointments: David H.
Souter (1990) ended up more liberal than
predicted and Clarence Thomas (1991)
has become in many ways the most
conservative. President Clinton's two
appointees, Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993)
and Stephen G. Breyer (1994), are in the
centrist mode of the man who brought
them to the bench, but they have distinct
differences and have often voted on
opposing sides.
Following are some of the important
alliances that have emerged during the
past five years. Thomas and Ronald
Reagan appointee Antonin Scalia (1986)
remain the strongest union among the
nine justices, although they have
increasingly diverged in their legal
reasoning. During the past half decade,
since these particular nine have been
together, Souter has voted most often
with Ginsburg.
During the past five years,
Anthony M. Kennedy has been on the
winning side most often, 86 percent,
followed by Sandra Day O'Connor at
80 percent. John Paul Stevens has
been a dissenter most often, at 48
percent.
During the past term there were
16 decisions with 5 to 4 votes, of a
total of 75 signed opinions. As is
typically the case, about 40 percent of
the cases were decided unanimously.
The five-justice bloc that prevailed
most was Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Scalia and Thomas.
Data analysis by Sarah Cohen.
Copyright C The Washington Post
Company
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FROM THE HIGH COURT, A VOICE QUITE DISTINCTL YA
WOMAN'S
The New York Times
Wednesday, May 26,1999
Linda Greenhouse
During her 18 years as a member,
Sandra Day O'Connor has often been the
Justice in the middle of a sharply divided
Supreme Court. On Monday, in the 5-to-4
decision on sexual harassment in the
schools, she was, perhaps more clearly
than ever before, the woman in the
middle as well.
There was a memorable scene, lasting
no more than 10 minutes, as Justice
O'Connor and Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy summarized their respective
majority and dissenting opinions for a
courtroom audience of lawyers and
tourists. The two Justices, both
Westerners in their 60's, both Stanford
University graduates, both appointees of
President Ronald Reagan, each the parent
of three grown children, might have been
speaking from different planets.
For Justice O'Connor, explaining the
majority's view that public school districts
can be held accountable for one student's
flagrant sexual harassment of another, the
case was about sex discrimination so
severe as to destroy the learning
environment in the classroom.
For Justice Kennedy, speaking for the
four dissenters, the case was about Federal
intrusion into a place where the Federal
Government has no business.
That Justice O'Connor and Justice
Kennedy are longtime allies in the cause
of states' rights made this non-meeting of
the minds all the more striking. Ever since
Sandra O'Connor arrived on the Court as
the F.W.O.T.S.C., as the First Woman
on the Supreme Court has dryly
referred to herself, the obvious
question has been, Does it make a
difference? The decision on
Monday-indeed, Justice O'Connor's
entire Supreme Court career when
viewed through the lens of gender-
suggests that it does.
That is not a notion completely
foreign to Justice O'Connor herself,
who, concurring in a 1994 decision
that made it unconstitutional to
remove prospective jurors on the
basis of sex, wrote that although there
were no "definitive studies" on how
jurors behaved in cases of sexual
harassment, child custody or domestic
abuse, "one need not be a sexist to
share the intuition that in certain cases
a person's gender and resulting life
experience will be relevant to his or
her view of the case."
Justice O'Connor usually votes
with the Court's conservative bloc on
other issues, including race
discrimination and criminal law
questions as well as federalism. That
makes her votes on issues of special
interest to women-most notably
abortion, on which she broke with the
conservatives in voting to uphold Roe
v. Wade in 1992-all the more
distinctive a part of her jurisprudence,
a distinction that dates from her
earliest days on the Court.
57
Her more liberal and more overtly
feminist colleague Ruth Bader Ginsburg
recounted in a 1997 speech to the
Women's Bar Association here that a year
earlier, as she announced her opinion
declaring unconstitutional the all-male
admissions policy at the Virginia Military
Institute, she looked across the bench at
Justice O'Connor and thought of the
legacy they were building together.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the
Virginia case cited one of Justice
O'Connor's earliest majority opinions for
the Court, a 1982 decision called
Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan that declared unconstitutional the
exclusion of male students from a state-
supported nursing school. Justice
O'Connor, warning against using "archaic
and stereotypic notions" about the roles
of men and women, herself cited in that
opinion some of the Supreme Court cases
that Ruth Ginsburg, who was not to join
the Court for another 11 years, had argued
and won as a noted women's rights
advocate during the1970's.
Addressing the women's bar group,
Justice Ginsburg noted that the vote in
Justice O'Connor's 1982 opinion was 5 to
4, while the vote to strike down men-only
admissions in Virginia 14 years later was 7
to 1.
"What occurred in the intervening
years in the Court, as elsewhere in
society?" Justice Ginsburg asked.
The answer, she continued, lay in a
line from Shakespeare that Justice
O'Connor had recently spoken in the
character of Isabel, Queen of France, in a
local production of "Henry V": "Haply a
woman's voice may do some good."
"I don't like the argument that we
have to have women or else nobody will
listen, but it does seem to be making a
difference," Suzanna Sherry, a law
professor at the University of
Minnesota, said in an interview today.
Professor Sherry said that while it had
always been clear that Justice
O'Connor had firsthand experience
with the classic model of sex
discrimination, "the question has been
whether she would recognize the
changing face of discrimination, and it
looks like she can."
Another scholar of the Court,
Nancy Maveety, a political scientist at
Tulane University who wrote a book
about Justice O'Connor, "Strategist of
the Supreme Court" (Rowman
Littlefield, 1996), also said she found
Justice O'Connor's vote on Monday,
in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, to have been notable.
"I would have expected a fence-
straddling concurrence," said
Professor Maveety, to whom the
outcome was an important indication
of the relative weight Justice
O'Connor gave the discrimination
arguments as opposed to the
federalism concerns of the dissenters.
"For something to trump federalism
for her, that's a big deal," Professor
Maveety said.
A top graduate of Stanford Law
School in 1952 (her classmate William
H. Rehnquist went on to a Supreme
Court clerkship, an opportunity not
then open to women), Sandra
O'Connor applied to law firms only to
receive job offers as a secretary. The
experience led her into the public
sector and eventually to elective
politics. She served as majority leader
of the Arizona State Senate in the
early 1970's, the first woman in the
country to hold so high a state
legislative office, and from there
became a state court judge.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a top graduate
of Harvard and Columbia Law Schools,
also found doors closed to her that should
have been open, although her career led
her to law school teaching and advocacy,
for some years under the aegis of the
American Civil Liberties Union.
While there are significant differences
in their politics and their views on many
issues, perhaps most notably the
appropriate role of race in political
districting and government contracting,
there is also clearly a bond between the
two Justices. They laugh about the fact
that some of the most experienced
lawyers in the country mix up their names
when addressing them during argument
sessions.
Some Court observers think the
presence of two women on the Court is
substantially greater than the sum of
one plus one. "Having two makes a
huge difference," said Peter J. Rubin, a
law professor at Georgetown
University who clerked on the Court
in the early 1990's, just before Justice
Ginsburg's arrival.
"It just makes it a lot easier," he
said. "It's only human nature. You're
in an insulated environment. You're
not out there on the ground. When
two colleagues who have had different
experiences say that here is a problem
to be taken very seriously, it's bound
to have an impact."
Copyright C 1999 The New York
Times Company
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AFTER A QUIET SPELL, JUSTICE FINDS VOICE
Conservative Thomas Emerges from the Shadow of Scalia
The Washington Post
May 24,1999, Monday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
He's been known by the company he's
kept.
For the past eight years, Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas has
walked in the shadow of Justice Antonin
Scalia. The pair have voted together more
than any other two justices, staking out
the court's conservative flank but also
inspiring criticism that Thomas is simply a
"clone" or "puppet" of the forceful, fiery-
tempered Scalia.
But increasingly, Thomas has been
breaking from Scalia, taking pains to
elaborate his own views and securing his
position as the most conservative justice
on the court.
So far this term, Thomas has more
than doubled the number of opinions he
has written to explain his individual
rationale, compared with the two previous
terms. And even though the most
controversial, divisive cases of the term
are yet to be announced, Thomas already
has voted differently from Scalia in several
significant disputes, including last week's
case on welfare payments for residents
new to a state and an earlier case on how
public schools must treat disabled
children. Through these and other
opinions, a more complex portrait is
emerging of the court's second black
justice, who had been best known among
the public for the sexual harassment
accusations made against him during his
1991 confirmation hearings.
"I think Thomas has turned out to be
a much more interesting justice than his
critics and probably even his supporters
expected," said Cass R. Sunstein, a
University of Chicago law professor. "He
is the strongest originalist on the court,
more willing to go back to history and
'first principles' of the Constitution."
"People in conservative legal circles
are definitely noticing that Thomas has
found his voice," said Daniel E. Troy, a
District lawyer and protege of former
conservative judge Robert H. Bork. "He is
more willing to strike out on his own."
This term offers new evidence of
Thomas's independent thinking. Of the 45
decisions handed down so far (31 still
remain), Thomas has differed from Scalia
in the bottom-line ruling of five, and in
five other cases he has been on the same
side as Scalia but has offered a separate
rationale. It's a substantial departure from
their previous pattern: Since 1991,
Thomas and Scalia have voted together
about 90 percent of the time. As recently
as two years ago, the two voted together
in all but one case.
For years, the reputations and
practices of the two men have helped feed
the widespread impression that Thomas
was content to follow Scalia's lead. Scalia,
a former law professor at the University
of Chicago and a longtime judge, was
already known for his narrow textualist
reading of the Constitution and federal
statutes when he joined the high court in
1986. His creative, aggressive approach
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inspired an admiring appeals court judge
to call Scalia a "giant flywheel in the great
judicial machine."
Thomas, meanwhile, had little
reputation as a scholar when he joined the
court in 1991. He had worked in the
federal bureaucracy for nearly a decade,
becoming prominent as chairman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. His conservatism, which
included opposition to affirmative action
programs, was viewed mostly in political
terms.
These impressions were reinforced by
the two justices' behavior at the high
court. Scalia, the first Italian American
justice, is a stylist of the first order, with a
sharp, sardonic edge. Last year, for
example, when he rejected a legal standard
used by the majority, he took a page from
Cole Porter, saying: "Today's opinion
resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the
Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Ghandi,
the Celophane of subjectivity, th' ol'
'shocks-the-conscience' test." In another
case, he said, "I join the opinion of the
court except that portion which takes
seriously, and thus encourages in the
future, an argument that should be
laughed out of court."
Thomas, by contrast, was quiet in his
early years, rarely speaking during oral
arguments and writing few of his own
concurring or dissenting opinions. He let
Scalia hold the pen: Whatever their joint
views, Scalia, 63, tended to write them up.
Thomas, 50, merely signed on. Legal
scholars on both the right and left publicly
criticized Thomas as a pawn.
Now, however, Thomas is showing an
increased willingness to express himself,
speaking before broader audiences and
writing more of his own opinions.
Thomas and Scalia are still very like-
minded justices. More than the other
conservative members of the Rehnquist
Court, they believe the Constitution
should be interpreted by looking at its
exact words and establishing the
intentions of the men who wrote it. They
are unwilling to read into a statute
anything not explicitly stated. They want
the government-particularly the federal
government-to get out of people's lives.
But Thomas is becoming the more
consistent standard-bearer of this brand
of conservatism. He would go further
than Scalia in overturning past court
rulings that he believes conflict with the
Constitution. And he is more likely than
Scalia to delve into legal history predating
the writing of the Constitution in 1787
and more inclined to reject recent case
law.
In last week's welfare case, for
example, Thomas began by tracing a core
constitutional provision from the 1606
Charter of Virginia: "Unlike the majority,
I would look to history to ascertain the
original meaning of the Clause," he wrote.
While Scalia signed onto the majority
opinion striking down limited welfare
benefits for residents newly arrived in a
state, Thomas and Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist dissented. Thomas wrote
that the majority was wrongly interpreting
the 14th Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause, raising "the specter
that the . .. Clause will become yet
another convenient tool for inventing new
rights, limited solely by the predilections
of those who happen at the time to be
members of this court."
Thomas has also distinguished himself
from Scalia by seeking more strongly to
buttress state authority. He has
emphasized that the Constitution's
authority flows from "the consent of the
people of each individual state, not the
consent of the undifferentiated people of
the nation as a whole."
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This accent on states' rights was
evident in a case earlier this term when
only Thomas fully dissented from a voting
rights decision that he believed too
broadly interpreted a federal law targeting
discrimination at the polls. "The section's
interference with state sovereignty is quite
drastic," he complained.
In another example of Thomas's
narrower reading of federal law, he and
Scalia were on opposite sides when the
court interpreted a statute intended to
guarantee equal educational opportunities
for disabled schoolchildren. Scalia voted
with the majority in the March case to
find that the federal disabilities law
requires public schools to provide a wide
variety of medical care for children with
severe handicaps.
Thomas dissented with Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy. "Congress enacted
[the law] to increase the educational
opportunities available to disabled
children, not to provide medical care for
them," Thomas wrote. "[W]e must ...
avoid saddling the states with obligations
that they did not anticipate."
Because Scalia did not write separately
in any of those three recent cases-on
welfare, voting rights and disabled
children-it is impossible to compare
directly his thinking with Thomas's. But
differences between the two were visible
when they both dissented from an April
ruling that said defendants who plead
guilty do not lose their right to remain
silent during a sentencing hearing and that
judges cannot use their silence against
them. Scalia wrote the main opinion for
the four dissenting justices, attempting to
discredit the case law on which the
majority relied. But Thomas also wrote a
separate opinion that went still further,
suggesting that an earlier case should be
overturned altogether. The "so-called
penalty" of having one's silence used
adversely, Thomas wrote, "lacks any
constitutional significance."
Some legal experts observe that
Thomas's willingness to give voice to his
solitary views recalls Rehnquist's position
on the court in the 1970s and Scalia's in
the late 1980s, before Thomas came on.
He's at a point, said Troy and other
observers, where he is comfortable
enough to express his singular views but
not so frustrated with writing alone that
he is prepared to compromise.
"Thomas comes to it more as an
outsider," said Alan Meese, a William and
Mary law professor, who has followed the
writings of Scalia and Thomas. "He
probably says when he looks at [an earlier
ruling], 'My God, we said that? That's
loony.' "
In Supreme Court, a More Vocal
Conservative
Justice Clarence Thomas has broken
from Justice Antonin Scalia in several
cases this term. With 45 rulings handed
down and 31 expected in the next six
weeks, they have voted differently in five
cases and were on the same side but with
a different rationale in five others. At this
point last year, Thomas and Scalia had
voted on different sides in only two cases;
the term before, in only one case. In those
prior terms, Thomas also wrote fewer
opinions explaining his rationale.
Cases in which the two voted differently:
Lopez v. Monterey County (voting rights)
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board
(telecommunications law)
Cedar Rapids Community School District
v. Garret F. (disabled students)
United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno
(firearms prosecution)
Saenz v. Roe (new resident welfare)
62
In these cases, they were on the same
side but Thomas wrote separately to
elaborate his rationale:
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation (restrictions on ballot
initiatives)
Holloway v. United States (carjacking)
South Central Bell Telephone Co. v.
Alabama (state taxation)
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band (Indian
treaty rights)




"[The majority opinion] raises the
specter that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will become yet another
convenient tool for inventing new rights,
limited solely by the predilections of those
who happen at the time to be members of
this court."
Cedar Rapids Community School District
v. Garrett F.
"Congress enacted [disabilities
education law] to increase the educational
opportunities available to disabled
children, not to provide medical care for
them. ... [W]e must interpret Spending
Clause legislation narrowly, in order to
avoid saddling the states with obligations
that they did not anticipate."
Lopez v. Monterey County
"There has been no legislative finding
that the State of California has ever
intentionally discriminated on the basis of
race, color, or ethnicity with respect to
voting. ... I do not see any reason to think
that ... the state's laws will be anything but
constitutional."
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Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Who would have thought there
would be more to say about Clarence
Thomas's tumultuous confirmation to
the Supreme Court? Countless words
have been spent in newspapers, books and
films on his nomination and the rowdy
Senate hearings that captivated the nation
in 1991.
But the man himself has something to
add.
Last month at a speech in Kansas
City, Thomas chronicled what happened
in the days leading up to President George
Bush's announcement that he wanted
Thomas to succeed Thurgood Marshall.
The nation's first black justice had
announced on June 27 that he was going
to retire after 24 years on the bench.
"That afternoon at about 4 o'clock, I
was spirited to the situation room at the
Justice Department," Thomas recalled to
the group of federal judges and lawyers
who gathered for an annual 8th Circuit
judicial conference. "It is a soundproof
room, a secure room and it is a bizarre
feeling. . . ."
"I was asked perfunctory questions.
And when I say perfunctory questions, I
mean perfunctory. 'Has anyone criticized
you and your wife because of interracial
marriage?'"
Thomas said he didn't want to reveal
the answer he gave, but said it was
"prescient," suggesting he continues to
believe the criticism he endured during
the ensuing hearings was motivated by
racism. After Anita Hill accused the
nominee of sexual harassment, Thomas
denied the charges and called the Senate
hearing "a high-tech lynching for uppity
blacks."
Thomas, whose speech was televised
on C-SPAN, said he wanted to "clarify"
the process that led up to his nomination,
then talked about what happened the next
day, Friday, June 28: "I was spirited to the
White House, by way of a tunnel from the
Treasury building."
"It was kind of clandestine,
surreptitious. I kind of liked that. Sort of
like a James Bond movie. I don't know
why. I've never seen a James Bond movie.
The movies were still segregated when
James Bond came out. So I'm still
protesting the James Bond movies."
Thomas laughed a bit, as did his
audience. He then recalled the seemingly
interminable wait at the White House.
"I sat there for a number of hours,"
Thomas said. "And I was told that if I
wasn't appointed that day I wouldn't be
nominated. So I kept my fingers crossed
that I wouldn't be nominated."
And, indeed, Thomas wasn't
nominated that day. He said he heard the
nominee might be Emilio Garza, a judge
in Texas who had been named to a federal
trial court by Ronald Reagan and then
elevated to the 5th Circuit appeals court
by Bush in early 1991. "Better him than
me," Thomas said he thought.
"On Saturday, my wife and I went to
Annapolis to celebrate my not being
nominated," he said, and joked that he
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was "off the hook." The next day, Sunday,
he went to his office at the D.C. Circuit
appeals court, a post that Bush had named
him to a year earlier, to catch up on some
work. One of his law clerks barged in and
said, "Kennebunkport is on the line,"
referring to Bush's Maine vacation home.
When Thomas picked up the line,
Bush said, "Can you come to
Kennebunkport to have lunch with me
tomorrow to discuss that Supreme Court
thing?" Thomas's recounting of Bush's
characteristically casual way with words
drew chuckles from his audience.
The next day, July 1, Thomas flew out
of Andrews Air Force Base and was
spirited into Bush's compound. Thomas
said that when he firshaw Barbara Bush,
she said "Congratulations." "And my
heart sank. And from then on, it was
surreal. . . . It was an out-of-body
experience."
Of his meeting with the president,
Thomas said, "He asked me a couple of
questions. 'Can you and your family
survive the confirmation?' Cavalierly, I
said yes." Then Thomas paused and said
with a sigh to his Kansas City audience, "I
was lucky to get through that one."
Bush had a second question: " 'If you
are nominated to the court, can you call
them as you see them?' To that, I
answered yes. Then he said, 'If you go on
the Supreme Court, I will never publicly
criticize you for any decision you ever
make. And I mean no decision.' He
repeated that several times.
And then he said, 'At 2 p.m. I will
appoint you to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Let's go have lunch.'"
And so history was made. That
afternoon of July 1, eight years ago, Bush
announced to the nation that he was
selecting "the best person at the right
time."
Copyright © 1999 The Washington Post
Company
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PUTTING SCALIA'S 'TEXTUALIST' VIEWS IN CONTEXT
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Friday, July 10, 1998
Timothy P. O'Neill
Statutory construction, like politics,
makes strange bedfellows. Consider the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case of
Muscarello v. U.S., 1998 LEXIS 3879
(une 8). There the court had to decide
whether a federal statute prohibiting a
person from "carrying a firearm" during
and in relation to a drug-trafficking
crime covered situations in which
firearms were located in a locked glove
compartment or a car trunk.
The court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that the statute covered this activity. The
dissenters were Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, and David H.
Souter -- four people you could not
imagine in a bridge foursome, much less
on the same side of a criminal case.
Similarly, in Bryan v. U.S., 1998 U.S.
LEXIS 4011 (June 15), the top court
had to determine the meaning of the
word "willfully" as used in the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act. Sillasse Bryan
was charged with "willfully" violating a
statute providing that dealers in firearms
had to have a federal license. The
evidence showed that Bryan dealt in
firearms and generally knew that his
conduct was illegal; however, there was
no evidence that he was specifically
aware of a federal licensing requirement.
The Supreme Court held, by a 6-3
vote, that "willfully" merely meant that
the prosecution had to prove that Bryan
generally knew his conduct was illegal; it
did not have to prove that Bryan was
actually aware of the federal licensing
requirement. The dissenters, siding with
the defense, were Scalia, Ginsburg and
Rehnquist.
Why this confusion? One of the
difficulties is that American law does
not have a generally agreed-upon
method for construing statutes.
Think back to your first year in law
school. The emphasis was on learning
the common-law method of
interpreting, glossing and distinguishing
case law. Perhaps the only course with
any statutory construction was criminal
law.
Yet the practice of law today is
largely concerned with the geometrically
increasing body of laws, statutes and
regulations that governments churn out.
First-year law school taught you the
skills to be a really fine common-law
judge in 18th century England. But
reading statutes requires different skills.
This problem was neatly summed up in
the title of Judge Guido Calabresi's
book "A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes."
One of the key battles in statutory
construction today concerns what role --
if any - "legislative history" should play.
The standard view can be seen in a
recent 3d District Appellate Court case,
People v. Davis, 1998 Ill.App. LEXIS
358 (June 4). The court said the primary
rule in construing a statute is to reflect
the intent of the legislature. This is
accomplished by examining the
language of the statute. However, when
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the language is ambiguous, the court
may look to the legislative history:
committee reports, floor debates and
prior statutory drafts.
Thus, in Davis, the court examined
a section of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
The court first concluded that the
statute governing the "preliminary
breath-screening test" was ambiguous.
It then turned to evidence such as
speeches the bill's sponsors made on the
floor of the House to reach its decision.
(The majority concluded that the results
of breath tests are admissible by the
state at a hearing to suppress evidence
and quash arrest for driving under the
influence of alcohol.)
Justice William E. Holdridge
dissented. He found the language of the
statute to be unambiguous. Thus, he
came to a different conclusion by
relying solely on the language of the
statute and by pointedly ignoring all
legislative history.
The use of legislative history in
Davis reflects the mainstream view of
American courts. Yet this position has
been completely rejected by Justice
Scalia. During his tenure on the
Supreme Court, he was regularly refused
to consult legislative history as an aid to
interpreting statutes. Scalia's adamant
rejection of legislative history is a
distinctly minority position among
American judges. Even so, he has had a
profound effect on the Supreme Court.
One study has shown that during
the 1981 term -- before Scalia joined the
court -- legislative history was used in
every one of the court's statutory
construction cases. Yet in the 1992 term
-- several years into Scalia's tenure on
the court -- legislative history was used
in only 18 percent of those cases.
Thomas W. Merrill, "Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine," 72
Wash. U. L. Q. 351, 355 (1994).
Scalia offered a formal defense of
his position in the Tanner Lectures at
Princeton in 1995. Both his lecture and
responses to it from eminent legal
scholars were published as a book in
1997, "A Matter of Interpretation."
Briefly, Scalia describes his method
of interpretation as "textualism." He
contends that the evil of going beyond
the text and into legislative history is
that it is too tempting for judges to pick
and choose only those committee
reports and floor speeches that support
the interpretation the judges wish to
reach. He argues that textualism is a way
of preventing activist judges from
engaging in "judicial lawmaking."
His position is spritedly attacked by
both Ronald Dworkin and Laurence
Tribe, who question even the possibility
of interpreting texts without considering
context. For example, to understand
what a speaker means by "That's a
beautiful diamond," it is important to
know whether those words were spoken
at Wrigley Field or in Tiffany's. (For a
concise -- and critical -- review of
Scalia's position, see Robert Post,
"Justice for Scalia," New York Review
of Books, June 11, 1998.)
Let's put aside for the moment
whether Scalia is right or wrong.
Consider the fact that of the three
justices who held for the defense in
both Muscarello and Bryan, two of
them were Scalia and Rehnquist.
Why are they such friends of the
accused?
Consider this. When the mainstream
American judge is faced with an
ambiguous criminal statute, legislative
history will "break the tie." Thus, the
result can go either way. Yet when a
textualist like Scalia faces the same
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ambiguous criminal statute, there is
always the same winner: the defendant.
This is because the textualist breaks ties
with the "rule of lenity," which holds
that all doubts are resolved in favor of
the criminal defendant. And indeed the
pro-defense dissents in both Muscarello
and Bryan -- each joined by Scalia and
Rehnquist -- invoked the rule of lenity
to side with the defense.
Defense attorneys should think
twice before rolling out the legislative
history to interpret ambiguous statutes.
If you follow Scalia's textualism,
statutory ambiguity leads directly to
acquittals and defense reversals.
Strange bedfellows indeed.
Criminal Procedure By Timothy P.
O'Neill. O'Neill is a professor of law at
The John Marshall Law School in
Chicago. In addition, he is reporter to
the Illinois Supreme Court Committee
on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal
Cases.
Copyright © 1998 by Law Bulletin
Publishing Company
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Questions of federalism and the limits
of congressional power have been a
hallmark of the Supreme Court under
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. They
deeply divided the justices on the final day
of the last term, and they already promise
to bedevil the justices this fall.
A major regulatory battle, First
Amendment issues, and an unusual race
bias appeal also highlight the docket next
term. While the cases accepted thus far
represent only a small portion of all the
decisions the Court will hand down by
June 2000, we can safely predict that,
starting Oct. 4, the justices will once again
be thrust into the thicket of public debate.
Two cases granted for next term will
put the justices squarely back in the fight
over federalism. In Reno v. Condon, No.
98-1464, the Court will consider whether
Congress had the constitutional authority
to pass the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act. The 1994 law prohibits states from
disclosing personal information submitted
to state motor vehicle departments. But
many states have their own laws
permitting motor vehicle bureaus to sell
lists that include names, addresses, phone
numbers, and identification numbers. And
sales of these lists can generate substantial
revenue.
In a challenge to the federal law
mounted by the state of South Carolina,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit ruled that Congress could not
justify passage of the law through either
its power to regulate interstate commerce
or its authority to enforce the provisions
of the 14th Amendment. The appeals
court relied on recent Supreme Court
precedents interpreting the 10th
Amendment to mean that Congress may
not compel the states to carry out federal
regulatory schemes and narrowing the
scope of congressional power under
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. In the
process, the 4th Circuit ended up
disagreeing with two of its sister circuits.
The issue of sovereign immunity split
the justices 5-4 three times at the close of
this term and should be equally divisive
next fall in the cases of Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, No. 98-791, and United
States v. Florida Board of Regents, No.
98-796. (See "The Quiet Revolution," Page
S23.) These companion cases ask whether
states are entitled to sovereign immunity
from lawsuits in federal court under the
federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Congress passed the
ADEA in 1967 to prohibit employment
discrimination based on age and extended
it in 1974 to apply to state employment
practices.
A Supreme Court decision three years
ago, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), spawned challenges to the ADEA-
-and led to a high-court-tempting split
among the federal courts of appeals. In
Seminole, the Supreme Court had ruled
that Congress may not void the states'
11th Amendment immunity from citizen
suits in federal court unless the law
expressly overrides sovereign immunity
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and unless the law is passed under Section
5 of the 14th Amendment. Now the
justices will review a decision by the 11th
Circuit that Congress, in barring age
discrimination in state employment,
neither made clear its intent to overcome
state sovereign immunity nor relied on the
14th Amendment to justify the statute.
Perhaps no case will draw more
attention than the already much-
publicized Food and Drug Administration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
No. 98-1152. Are tobacco products
subject to regulation by the FDA? The
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act gives the
agency authority to regulate "drugs" or
"devices" that are "intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body."
The FDA says that cigarettes and other
tobacco products fall within this
regulatory mandate because of the
addictive effects of nicotine. Accordingly,
the agency issued regulations for the sale
and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products. But the 4th Circuit
ruled that the FDA has no jurisdiction
over tobacco.
School Supplies
The Court has several important First
Amendment issues awaiting decision next
term. One case, Mitchell v. Helms, No.
98-1648, raises the question of whether
federal aid to education may be used to
provide computers, software, and library
books to parochial schools. The 5th
Circuit ruled that the federal aid law and
its Louisiana counterpart violate the
establishment clause as applied (in
Jefferson Parish, just south of New
Orleans).
The case involves Chapter 2 of Tide I
of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, which makes
block grants to state and local education
programs to assist in innovation. Under
federal and state law, the funds are to be
used for public and private schools, which
in many cities include large numbers of
parochial schools. Mitchell v. Helms gives
the justices an opportunity to reconsider
just how strictly to maintain the separation
between church and state. It could shed
significant light on the propriety of
publicly funded vouchers to pay tuition at
religious schools.
The most closely watched among free
speech cases may be Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, No. 98-963,
which involves the constitutionality of
Missouri's campaign contribution limits.
The 8th Circuit declared unconstitutional
the 1994 state law capping contributions
from an individual to a candidate for
statewide office at $1, 075. The appeals
court said that the contribution limits
interfered with free speech rights and that
the state's wish to reduce the corrupting
influence of large donations was
inadequate.
This case has generated extraordinary
interest among campaign finance reform
groups. Some are urging the Court to
reconsider its landmark decision, Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which upheld
contribution limits to federal campaigns,
but invalidated spending limits. Other
groups and 30 states have filed amicus
briefs arguing for First Amendment
flexibility so that states can usefully
regulate campaign contributions.
The Supreme Court is never far
removed from disputes about indecency
or sexually explicit activity, and next term
is no exception. In Erie, Pa. v. Pap's A.M.,
No. 98-1161, the justices will review a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling
striking down a local ordinance that
prohibited nudity in public places,
including bars and dance clubs. The state
court said that the Erie ordinance violated
the First Amendment guarantee of
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freedom of speech. In addition, the
Pennsylvania court said that it could glean
no useful guidance from a U.S. Supreme
Court decision upholding a similar
Indiana law because the Court was
"hopelessly fragmented" in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
In United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, No. 98-1682, the
justices will decide whether part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 violates
the free speech rights of cable television
operators and subscribers. Section 505 of
the sweeping federal law requires that
cable operators providing indecent or
sexually explicit programming either must
fully scramble or block their signal so that
only subscribers can receive it or must
restrict their programming to "safe
harbor" hours (between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m.). A special three-judge panel in
Delaware held the provision
unconstitutional because it essentially
forced cable operators to reduce their
program hours; technical solutions to the
problem of "signal bleed" were too
expensive.
Yet another First Amendment case
asks whether a public university may use
mandatory student fees to fund
organizations engaging in political and
ideological activities when students object
to this allocation of their cash. In Board
of Regents v. Southworth, No. 98-1189,
the 7th Circuit concluded that the
University of Wisconsin violated the free
speech rights of students who objected to
fees being used to fund a campus
women's center that lobbied against anti-
abortion laws and an environmental group
that lobbied against mining and supported
a presidential bid by Ralph Nader.
An unusual Hawaii voting rights case,
Rice v. Cayetano, No. 98-818, gives the
Court another chance to rule on when and
how race may be used as a factor in
government decisions. Hawaiian law
permits only persons descended from the
original residents of the Hawaiian Islands
to vote in special elections for an office
that administers a public trust fund for the
benefit of those native Hawaiians. The 9th
Circuit upheld this restriction under the
14th and 15th amendments. Although the
Hawaiian law is unique, the Supreme
Court's decision could affect other voting
rights cases and affirmative action
programs.
On the criminal docket, the case of
Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-1036, asks the
Court to decide whether police on patrol
in a high-crime area may stop a person
because he fled when he saw the police
approaching. The Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that Chicago police did not have a
sufficient basis to suspect and stop an
individual who ran when he saw a police
car driving down the street.
So far, the Supreme Court has agreed
to review 28 cases for the next term and
has carried over one other case for
reargument. Based on their total of 75
decisions in the term just ended, the
justices have already filled slightly more
than one-third of their upcoming docket.
If these cases are any indication, the
October 1999 term should be an
interesting ride.
Stephen J. Wermiel is associate director of
the Program on Law and Government at
American University Washington College
of Law, where he teaches media law and
seminars on the Supreme Court.
Assessing the 1999-2000 Docket
Top 10 So Far
* Board of Regents v. Southworth, No.
98-1189. Does it violate the free speech
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rights of students to use mandatory
activity fees to fund ideological groups to
which those students are opposed?
* Erie, Pa. v. Pap's A.M., No. 98-1161.
Does a state ordinance prohibiting nudity
in bars and dance clubs survive First
Amendment scrutiny?
* Food and Drug Administration v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No.
98- 1152. Does the FDA have the
authority under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to regulate cigarettes and
other tobacco products?
* Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-1036. Do
the police have sufficient suspicion to
stop a person simply because he flees at
the approach of the police?
* Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
United States v. Florida Board of Regents,
Nos. 98-791, 98-796. Do states have
sovereign immunity from claims under the
federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act?
* Mitchell v. Helms, No. 98-1648. Does
it violate church-state separation for states
to direct federal education aid toward
providing parochial schools with
computers and library books?
* Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, No. 98-963. Does a Missouri law
limiting state campaign contributions to
$1, 075 violate the First Amendment?
* Reno v. Condon, No. 98-1464. Does
Congress have the power to bar states
from releasing state driver's registration
information?
* Rice v. Cayetano, No. 98-818. Is a
Hawaiian law that restricts certain voting
rights based on race constitutional?
* United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, No. 98-1682. Does the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 violate
the free speech rights of cable operators
by inappropriately restricting indecent
programming?
Stephen J. Wermiel
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